What South Africa’s 2026 AML Amendment Bill Changes for Transaction Monitoring Records, PEP Files and Technology Risk

South Africa’s AML Amendment Bill is the legislative follow-through to the country’s October 2025 exit from the FATF grey list. The General Laws (Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorism Financing) Amendment Bill [B15-2026] was introduced by the Minister of Finance on 27 May 2026 and amends five Acts, including the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (FICA). Parliament describes its aim as addressing the remaining deficiencies from the 2021 FATF mutual evaluation and the remedial process that ended in the grey-list exit, and securing a better rating in the current evaluation, which concludes in October 2027.

The Standing Committee on Finance completed clause-by-clause deliberations on 23 September 2026 but did not formally adopt the Bill, according to Moonstone’s report of the meeting. It still has to be adopted by the committee, pass the National Assembly and go through the National Council of Provinces, and its wording has been changing in committee. The provisions below are described as they stood in that report.

That makes this a planning article rather than a compliance requirement. For a monitoring team, four proposals matter more than the rest.

The Bill’s FICA proposals that touch monitoring work: lifestyle audits and PEP files, record periods, technology risk in the RMCP and group host-country risk.

Where the Bill stands

The Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s page on B15-2026 shows it as under consideration by the National Assembly and classified under section 75, which covers ordinary Bills not affecting the provinces. At the 23 September meeting a committee member questioned that classification and Parliamentary Legal Services undertook to reconsider it. Under either classification the Bill goes to the National Council of Provinces.

The reports reviewed on 27 October 2026 showed no later step.

Lifestyle audits and the domestic PEP file

ENS’s analysis of the draft Bill notes that the FIC may at present conduct a lifestyle audit only if it is already following a suspicious financial trail, and that the proposed amendments remove that limitation. The firm describes a lifestyle audit as a preliminary indicator, not a prosecution mechanism.

In committee, the Bill would let the FIC audit persons listed in Schedule 3A of FICA (domestic politically exposed persons) or another category the Minister prescribes, at the request of an organ of state, public entity or municipality. The condition on requests was tightened. National Treasury proposed that the requesting body must be entitled to the information and that the FIC must be satisfied of that, replacing a test that the body was affected by or had an interest in it.

An accountable institution does not conduct lifestyle audits. A reasonable reading is that an audit asks whether a person’s standard of living matches legitimate income, which is the same question a domestic PEP’s source-of-wealth record and monitoring profile already try to answer.

Seven-year records

As reported, specified record-retention periods under FICA would increase from five to seven years. The FIC has said institutions would not have to reconstruct records that had already been lawfully destroyed, but records still in existence when the amendments commence would become subject to the longer period.

For monitoring teams the practical effect falls on alert, case and customer-profile records that sit on five-year schedules.

Technology risk and group host-country risk

Risk Management and Compliance Programmes would have to address risks associated with new delivery mechanisms and new or developing technologies. An accountable institution operating internationally would also have to consider the host country’s risk level. Where local law prevented a measure FICA requires, it would have to apply appropriate additional measures and inform the FIC and the relevant supervisory body. Separately, giving effect to a business relationship or single transaction with an anonymous client or one acting under a false or fictitious name would be non-compliance subject to administrative sanction.

Beneficial ownership discrepancies and the NPO sector

Two further strands may reach some institutions. The Companies Act amendments would create a category of discrepancy reporting institution, set by the Minister, that would have to report material differences between the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission’s beneficial ownership register and the information the institution holds. Not every accountable institution would be in that category. The NPO Act amendments would widen the Directorate for NPOs’ role to monitoring and enforcing compliance, with administrative sanctions and offences carrying up to R1 million, five years’ imprisonment, or both. NPO representatives raised concerns in committee, and the Department of Social Development said supervision would be risk-based and proportionate.

A readiness checklist while the text moves

Nothing here needs to change before the Bill is final. Four preparatory steps cost little and avoid rework.

How Nexiant supports reform readiness

FraudShield, Nexiant’s specialist transaction-monitoring brand, is built around real-time detection, configurable rule logic and case-management workflows. For reform readiness, the useful tests of any monitoring capability are whether retention can be set by record type and changed without losing history, whether PEP-related alerts and profile changes sit in one case record, and whether the reason for a rule change is kept. Nexiant brings these questions together across KYC, fraud and monitoring as a design discipline, not as a claim about one integrated system.

Frequently Asked Questions

This article was accurate at the time of publication in October 2026 and is intended for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal, regulatory or compliance advice. Organisations should seek qualified professional guidance in relation to their specific obligations.